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FERNANDEZ V. CALIFORNIA AND THE EXPANSION OF THIRD-PARTY 
CONSENT SEARCHES 
 
Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014) 
 
Anna P. Hayes* 
Imagine a day when the police come knocking at your door: you 
open the door, and the police ask you if they may conduct a warrantless 
search of your residence. As any good constitutional law student would, 
you explain to them that you are well aware of your rights under the 
Fourth Amendment, and that they should come back with a warrant. 
Because the dutiful officers believe that you have committed a crime, 
they arrest you on the spot, rather than obtaining a search warrant for 
the premises. After arresting you and removing you from the premises, 
the officers then ask your roommate for permission to search the 
premises—not as well schooled in Fourth Amendment law, your 
roommate signs over his consent.1 You protest: “I refused to consent to 
the search!” you say—“the police can’t ignore my objection!” The 
Supreme Court in Fernandez v. California recently ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment does not forbid a search such as the one discussed above.2 
This Comment will discuss the history behind the consent exception to 
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the Fernandez decision, 
and its implications for future police activity.  
The Fernandez case began in 2009, when an assailant, armed with a 
knife, committed a gang-related robbery. 3  Police investigating the 
robbery drove to an alley they knew to be frequented by members of the 
gang.4 Upon their arrival in the gang’s territory, a man approached the 
officers and told them that “the guy is in the apartment.”5 The man, who 
“appeared very scared,” then repeated: “He’s in there. He’s in the 
apartment.”6 Immediately thereafter, the officers witnessed another man 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. 2014, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S. 2011, Georgia Institute of 
Technology. I am grateful to all of the members of the Florida Law Review, especially Karl 
Gruss and Kathleen Carlson, for their support and friendship, and to Professor Dennis Calfee for 
his superb dedication to every member of the Review. 
 1. As there is no Miranda-esque requirement that police make statements to any person 
whose residence they search warning the subject of the search that he or she has a right to refuse 
to give consent, this situation is likely to continue to occur. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 231–32 (1973) (citation omitted) (stating that the suggestion that police inform the 
subject of the search that he has a right to refuse consent has been consistently rejected because 
“these situations are still immeasurably far removed from ‘custodial interrogation’ where, in 
Miranda v. Arizona, we found that the Constitution required certain now familiar warnings”).  
 2. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6. People v. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 
1126 (2014). 
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run from the alley into an apartment building, another known gang 
hideout. 7  After the man entered the apartment, the officers heard 
screams and other sounds of fighting emitting from the residence.8  
After waiting for backup to arrive, the officers knocked on the door 
of the residence from which they had heard the screams.9 A woman 
opened the door—she “appeared to be crying[, h]er face was 
red, . . . she had a large bump on her nose,” and her hand and shirt were 
stained with seemingly fresh blood.10 She told the officers that she had 
been in a fight, and when the officers asked her if anyone else was in 
the apartment, she told them that she was alone with her son and that no 
one else was present.11 When the officers asked her if she would step 
outside so that they could conduct a protective sweep of the apartment, 
a man—the petitioner, dressed only in his underwear and seemingly 
agitated—appeared in the doorway.12 The man objected to the search, 
stating: “You don’t have any right to come in here. I know my rights.”13 
The officers suspected domestic violence and immediately removed the 
man from the residence and placed him under arrest.14 After the victim 
of the robbery identified the man as his attacker, officers escorted the 
man to the police station for booking.15  
One hour after the initial arrest, officers returned to the apartment, 
informed the woman that they had arrested the petitioner, and again 
asked for permission to search the premises.16 The woman consented to 
the search. 17  In the apartment, police found gang paraphernalia, a 
weapon and clothing similar to those used by the robbery suspect, 
ammunition, and a sawed-off shotgun—however, the police never 
found any of the items stolen from the robbery victim.18  Using the 
evidence they did find, the government charged the petitioner with 
“robbery, infliction of corporal injury upon a spouse, cohabitant, or 
                                                                                                                     
 7. Id.  
 8. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 1130. 
 9. Id. Note that this Comment does not discuss whether the police would have been 
justified in entering the premises on the basis of exigent circumstances, a widely recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (“[I]f truly exigent circumstances exist no warrant is required under 
general Fourth Amendment principles.”). 
 10. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 1130. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. This Comment does not address whether this search could be deemed a valid 
search incident to arrest.  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1130–31; People v. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), 
aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014). 
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child’s parent, possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a short-
barreled shotgun, and felony possession of ammunition.”19 
At his trial, the petitioner moved to suppress the evidence found 
during what he characterized as a warrantless search of his apartment in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 20  He claimed that the consent 
exception to the warrant requirement was not met in his case, because 
he had objected to the search before the police forcibly removed him 
from the premises. However, the Supreme Court found that the search 
was lawful and that the consent given by the petitioner’s coresident 
validated the warrantless search.21  
Generally, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
dictates that officers may search a jointly owned residence if one of the 
occupants consents to the search and that police may discover and use 
evidence against an absent, nonconsenting co-occupant.22 However, the 
Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the consenting 
coresident rule in Georgia v. Randolph and held that consent from any 
coresident to a warrantless search is invalid when another coresident is 
present and objects to the search.23 How then, under Randolph, was the 
search conducted in Fernandez lawful? Before analyzing the soundness 
of the Fernandez ruling and its ramifications, this Comment will discuss 
the establishment of the third-party consent exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement and Randolph’s narrowing of that 
exception. 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”24 The courts have interpreted “unreasonable” to 
mean without a warrant—meaning that any search performed without a 
warrant is per se unreasonable. 25  In United States v. Matlock, the 
Supreme Court made clear that a warrantless search is nevertheless 
valid when “permission to search [is] obtained from a third party who 
possessed common authority over . . . the premises.”26 However, the 
Court later narrowed the consent exception in Georgia v. Randolph. In 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1131 (citations omitted).  
 20. Fernandez, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58. 
 21.  Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130. 
 22. Id. at 1129 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)).  
 23. 547 U.S. 103, 114 (2006) (“Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third 
party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and 
objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim 
to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 25. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 26. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170–71 (1974). 
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Randolph, the Court held that even if one cotenant gives permission to 
search, “a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit 
entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and 
invalid as to him.”27  
In Randolph, the police arrived at the residence of a married couple 
after the wife reported a domestic dispute.28 When the officers arrived at 
the residence, the wife alleged that her husband was a cocaine user who 
had drug paraphernalia stored inside their house.29 The police requested 
permission to search the marital residence, and the husband 
“unequivocally refused.” 30  Immediately after his refusal, the officer 
“turned to [the wife] for consent to search, which she readily gave.”31 
Inside the home, the police discovered a substance that they suspected 
was cocaine and other evidence of drug use.32 At his trial, the husband 
moved to suppress the evidence found, but the trial court rejected the 
motion because the wife “had common authority to consent to the 
search.”33 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question that 
had arisen as to whether one coresident can give consent that can 
override the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement “against a co-
tenant who is present and states a refusal to permit the search.”34 The 
Court held that a warrantless search conducted over the express refusal 
of a physically present resident is not reasonable, even if another 
coresident does consent to the search. 35  In its opinion, the Court 
emphasized that the key consideration for consent searches is not 
technical property law, but “the great significance given to widely 
shared social expectations.”36 Social norms dictate that a guest would 
not feel welcome to enter a residence if one resident stood at the door 
calling the guest to come in, while another coresident stood in the same 
doorway warning the guest to stay out.37 As the Court surmised, “[N]o 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106. 
 28. Id. at 107. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 107–08. 
 34. Id. at 108 (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. at 120. 
 36. Id. at 111 (stating also that these social expectations “are naturally enough influenced 
by the law of property, but [are] not controlled by its rules”); see also id. at 120–21 (“[T]he 
‘right’ to admit the police to which Matlock refers is not an enduring and enforceable ownership 
right as understood by the private law of property, but is instead the authority recognized by 
customary social usage as having a substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in 
specific circumstances.”). 
 37. Id. at 113. 
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sensible person would go inside under those conditions;” and therefore, 
the consent exception to the warrant requirement cannot overcome a 
present objector. 38  The Court cited several examples where social 
customs would not dictate acceptable entry, including a landlord–tenant 
relationship (where no person would reasonably expect that a tenant 
would allow a landlord to let visitors into the residence), and a hotel 
manager (where no one would expect anyone but hotel employees to be 
allowed access into occupied rooms).39 However, the Supreme Court 
admitted to drawing a fine line—the line which became the very issue 
of Fernandez: when the police have a nearby coresident, a potential 
objector, the officers do not have to “invite[] [the nearby coresident] to 
take part in the threshold colloquy, [who then] loses out.”40 Thereafter, 
a question remained for the Fernandez court: What side of the “fine 
line” does a search fall on when it occurs after a formerly present 
defendant is present and objects, but the police remove the defendant 
before asking the cotenant for permission to search?41 
In Fernandez, the Court held that the “narrow exception” to the 
consent rule created by Randolph42 did not apply when a cotenant gave 
police consent to search a residence even when a defendant objected to 
the search, because the defendant was not physically present when the 
cotenant consented to the search. 43  The only significant difference 
between the facts in Randolph and the facts in Fernandez was that the 
police removed the objector before asking the cotenant for permission 
to search.44 The Court noted that Randolph “went to great lengths to 
make clear that its holding was limited to situations in which the 
objecting occupant is present.”45 This emphasis on physical presence 
spurred the Fernandez Court to rule constitutional a search where the 
defendant was not physically present at the time his cotenant consented 
to the search—even when the police caused the absence of the 
defendant–objector.46 The defendant in Fernandez made two arguments: 
first, that the physical “presence of the objecting occupant is not 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Id. at 1114–15 (“Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no 
recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant, 
his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in 
entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”). 
 39. Id. at 112. 
 40. Id. at 121.  
 41. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014). 
 42. Id. at 1133. 
 43. Id. at 1134 (stating that the petitioner’s arguments that “his absence should not matter 
since he was absent only because the police had taken him away,” or that the fact that he 
objected to the search while physically present on the premises should have remained effective 
until he no longer wished to keep the police out of his home, were both unsound). 
 44. Compare id., with Randolph, 547 U.S. 103. 
 45. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1133–34. 
 46. Id. 
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necessary when the police are responsible for his absence,” 47  and 
second, that the defendant’s “objection, made at the threshold of the 
premises that the police wanted to search, remained effective until he 
changed his mind and withdrew his objection.”48 
The Fernandez Court rejected the first argument and brushed off any 
suggestion of impropriety arising when police remove an objecting 
cotenant after his objection to the search, stating that the mere 
suggestion of improper motive should not invalidate a removal that is 
objectively justified.49 Here, the Court went astray from the ruling in 
Randolph and cases prior—it failed to “jealously and carefully draw[]” 
the consent exception to the warrant requirement.50 The Court refused to 
examine the motives of the police because it felt that the arrest was 
unquestionably justified.51 When it ignored the possible motive of the 
police to skirt the Fourth Amendment, the Court seriously blurred the 
line governing police conduct during a warrantless search. Even more, 
the Court disregarded Randolph’s warning that there should be “no 
evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant 
from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection.”52 In 
doing so, the Court has opened the door to serious police confusion and 
even potential misconduct. Fernandez allows courts to ignore concerns 
that police may have incentives to purposefully evade the Fourth 
Amendment. Given the growing public distrust of the police arising 
from officer misconduct in places such as New York City 53  and 
Ferguson, Missouri,54 the Fernandez Court’s decision to turn a blind 
eye to the potentially illicit motivations of police officers contrasts 
sharply with public demands to bring police practices under the 
microscope.55  
                                                                                                                     
 47. Id. at 1134. 
 48. Id. at 1135. 
 49. Id. at 1134. 
 50. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). 
 51. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134. 
 52. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006). 
 53. See, e.g., Chris Francescani, Silent March to Protest NYPD’s “Stop-and-Frisk” 
Policy, REUTERS (Jun. 17, 2012, 7:36 PM), http://www.nyclu.org/news/decision-moves-city-
one-step-closer-stop-and-frisk-reform. 
 54. In Ferguson, Missouri, a black teenager was shot six times and killed by a police 
officer. This shooting triggered days of violent protests, looting, hundreds of arrests, and the 
governor of Missouri calling out the National Guard to help stop the riots. See, e.g., Monica 
Davey, John Eligon & Alan Blinder, National Guard Troops in Ferguson Fail to Quell Disorder, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/us/ferguson-
missouri-protests.html; Alan Scher Zagier, Tensions Subside After Peaceful Ferguson Protests, 
ABC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2014, 4:42 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/streets-ferguson-
stay-calm-violent-nights-25095870 (stating that one resident believes “some of the frustration is 
dying down because more information is coming out”).  
 55.  See also Erwin Chemerinsky, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y. 
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The Court has repeatedly in Fourth Amendment cases rejected 
invitations to examine the investigating officer’s mindset and instead 
has reached for objective standards with which to analyze searches and 
seizures.56 However, the Fernandez Court refused to consider that there 
were objective reasons as to why a police officer would remove a 
potential objector from the premises to avoid hearing an objection that 
could undermine the search. The temptation for unjustified removal 
becomes all the more powerful when a police officer can remove a 
coresident who has already objected to the search; for then, the officer 
has the opportunity to persuade remaining coresidents to consent. 
Not only has the Court implicitly allowed possible police 
misconduct to occur undeterred, but it has undermined the good 
intentions of even the most honest and law-abiding civil servants. How 
should an officer know when he can remove an objecting cotenant and 
still receive permission to search the premises? On one hand, the police 
officer knows he is not supposed to act in direct contravention of the 
spirit of the warrant requirement.57 On the other hand, if the officer does 
not conduct the search, he may lose valuable evidence that could keep a 
dangerous criminal off of the streets. The Court also left open the 
question of whether a police officer must wait after hearing an objection 
and removing the objector to get consent to search—an hour was 
deemed reasonable in Fernandez,58 but what about thirty minutes? Ten 
minutes? Two?59  
                                                                                                                     
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-
the-supreme-court-protects-bad-cops.html?_r=0 (asserting that the Supreme Court has also 
made civil suits against police officers extraordinarily difficult to pursue). 
 56. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (“The scheme of the Fourth 
Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those 
charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a 
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the 
particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged 
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken 
was appropriate?” (footnote omitted) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 
(1925)); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (“An action is ‘reasonable’ 
under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’ The officer’s subjective motivation is 
irrelevant.” (alteration in original)). 
 57. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (discussing the Miranda warnings and stating generally that courts “have no doubt 
that . . . the police behave responsibly and do not deliberately exert [inappropriate] pressures 
upon the suspect[s]” but that bright-line rules, such as those set in place by Miranda are to 
ensure against the rare police misconduct, relieve “inherently compelling pressures,” and “as 
much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases”).  
 58. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130. 
 59. It would seem that the Court in Fernandez, by not dictating a timeframe requirement, 
has made it possible for an officer to hear an objection, remove the objector from the premises, 
7
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Interestingly, the majority concluded that the petitioner’s second 
argument (that an objection lasts for as long as the objector desires) is 
unworkable because of practical problems arising from any permanent 
objection,60 but also rejected the argument that the objection should last 
only for a “reasonable” time.61 However, the problems with allowing 
objections to last for a “reasonable” time are mirrored in the majority’s 
solution that the objector must be physically present—for it is doubtful 
that the Randolph Court envisioned a day when police could remove a 
physically present objector from the premises, only to receive consent 
seconds later.62 The Court in Fernandez should have more seriously 
considered the argument that the objection last for a “reasonable time,” 
especially because “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
‘reasonableness.’”63  Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of drawing clear lines to help the police 
adhere to the standards set forth by our forefathers when they drafted 
the Bill of Rights64—Fernandez blurs a formerly clear line, seemingly 
without regard to its future implications. 
The majority in Fernandez addressed the concern with societal 
norms echoed in Randolph, maintaining that if a social caller were to 
request entry, the caller would be concerned only with obtaining 
permission to enter only from those residents who are physically 
                                                                                                                     
and immediately ask the remaining cotenant for permission to search, all in the space of a few 
minutes.  
 60. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135–36 (imagining a situation where a coresident would 
never be able to consent to a search, even decades after the original objection). 
 61. Id. at 1136 (“Nor are we persuaded to hold that an objection lasts for a ‘reasonable’ 
time. ‘[I]t is certainly unusual for this Court to set forth precise time limits governing police 
action,’ and what interval of time would be reasonable in this context? A week? A month? A 
year? Ten years?” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).  
 62. Presumably, after a time period this short, a court would be forced to examine any 
“evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the 
sake of avoiding a possible objection.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006).  
 63. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 64. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“A police officer’s 
determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is 
necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be 
broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search.”). Police officers 
arguably need easy, bright-line rules to follow—in the heat of the moment, police should not be 
required to undergo a complicated analysis, compile all the case law the officer knows, and 
make a fact-based determination based on the facts he knows in that moment. What an officer 
needs in order to promote justice and equality is a bright-line, easy-to-apply rule—for instance, 
a rule that says an officer may not perform a consent search once an objection has been made 
from a cotenant who was physically present—even if the objector is no longer present when a 
different cotenant gives the officer permission to perform such a search. See also, e.g., Dunaway 
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979) (“A single, familiar standard is essential to guide 
police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and 
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”). 
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present.65 The Court found it quite obvious that a caller would not be 
deterred from entry if the caller heard an objection, but the objector then 
left the premises and the caller received an invitation to enter. 66 
Fernandez emphasized that a social caller would be even more likely to 
enter “when [the caller] know[s] that the objector will not return during 
the course of the visit.”67 The treatment of social norms in Fernandez, 
in stark contrast with the decision under Randolph, 68  adopted this 
cursory treatment of societal norms to reach the conclusion that its 
decision did not contradict the reasoning behind Randolph. Although 
the Court addresses this question of social expectations with ease, the 
reasoning in Randolph seems to contradict the Fernandez majority’s 
quick treatment of the issue. After all, “when people living together 
disagree over the use of their common quarters, a resolution must come 
through voluntary accommodation, not by appeals to authority.” 69 
Randolph imagined that upon hearing a cotenant object to entry, a social 
caller would be reluctant to disregard that person’s authority and still 
enter the premises.70 Indeed, “no sensible person would go inside under 
those conditions.”71 
Justice Ginsberg’s dissent asserted that the majority opinion in 
Fernandez “shrinks to petite size our holding in Georgia v. Randolph 
that ‘a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a 
police search [of his home] is dispositive as to him, regardless of the 
consent of a fellow occupant.’”72 Indeed, Fernandez could eliminate 
altogether the usefulness of the Randolph exception to the consent 
rule.73 The dissent also recognized that the significant facts recognized 
in Randolph are mirrored in Fernandez: a warrantless search, not 
subject to exigent circumstances, was purposed on finding evidence to 
use against a suspect; the suspect, while physically on the premises—in 
fact, inside the doorway—objected to the search; and the officers could 
easily have secured the premises for the time necessary to obtain a 
warrant. 74  Finally, investigating officers are often extraordinarily 
concerned with the destruction of evidence in the time required to 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). 
 69. Id. at 113–14.  
 70. Id. at 113. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1139 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) 
(citation omitted).  
 73. Because the majority refused to adopt a “reasonable time” for an objection to last, a 
police officer after Fernandez may hear an objection, remove the objector, and go immediately 
back to the residence to obtain consent from a remaining coresident. Id. at 1136 (majority 
opinion).  
 74. Id. at 1139 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
9
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obtain a warrant; however, this was not a drug case or a case with 
similarly destructible evidence—“with the objector in custody, there 
was scant danger to persons on the premises, or risk that evidence might 
be destroyed or concealed, pending request for, and receipt of, a 
warrant.”75 
The majority did recognize several legitimate problems with 
allowing a formerly present objector to override consent given by a 
coresident upon the absence of the objector: Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence shies away from fuzzy, subjective standards, and to 
institute a “reasonable time” for which a formerly present objector 
could override consent would be difficult for police to implement.76 
However, as discussed above, the police will likely find the Fernandez 
standard just as difficult to work with, given that officers must avoid 
“remov[ing] the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the 
sake of avoiding a possible objection.” 77  Courts, too, will find it 
problematic to determine whether police attempted to remove an 
objector purely to avoid the warrant requirement—an issue made 
especially difficult after Fernandez confirmed a precedent of ignoring 
the subjective motives of the police.78  
The majority also spotted the problem of “the procedure needed to 
register a continuing objection;” that is, whether preemptive objections 
could be made, or even whether a potential defendant could put in a 
“standing objection” with the local police.79 Finally, the Court noted 
that problems would arise with regards to which police officers would 
be bound by a prior objection—would the objection extend to officers 
who were not on scene at the moment of the objection?80  Could a 
different law enforcement agency (such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation) be bound by the previously present objector, even if those 
officers were not on scene?81  
Although these problems are legitimate, lower courts are capable of 
handling these case-by-case questions as they inevitably arise. More 
serious questions are raised by the majority’s solution: can our 
communities trust police officers not to coerce unknowing residents to 
consent to searches by threatening removal of any objectors?82 How can 
                                                                                                                     
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1136. Moreover, the Court acknowledged its own reticence to “set[ting] forth 
precise time limits governing police action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006). 
 78. Cf. id. at 122. 
 79. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1136. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. In the wake of police misconduct such as the stop-and-frisk procedures deemed 
unconstitutional in New York City, it is unlikely that communities, especially those made up of 
targeted minorities, will put such faith in their officers. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects 
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police officers be expected to guard themselves against the temptation 
to violate constitutional rights when the courts are turning a blind eye? 
Should police officers bear the burden of determining where the blurry 
consent search line can be drawn in each instance, when even the 
highest Court in the country is constantly redefining the metes and 
bounds of the Fourth Amendment?83  
Under the facts in Fernandez, the Court could have deemed the 
search unreasonable and unconstitutional in light of Randolph, and 
should have done so in light of the policy concerns highlighted in this 
Comment. Because the defendant was physically present at the time of 
the objection, and because of the short time period between his 
objection and his cotenant’s consent to search the premises,84 this search 
should have been deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 
especially when considering societal norms.85  Although the majority 
may have toed the “fine line”86 drawn in Randolph, it did so without 
considering its ramifications. This adherence to the letter of the law 
without regard to the spirit of the law87 is bound to cause confusion in 
our justice system and impede the ability of honorable civil servants 
from protecting constitutional rights. The Court in Fernandez blurred 
the line between the consent exception to the warrant requirement and 
an unreasonable search in violation of the Constitution—because this 
standard is unworkable, confusion will result when both police and 
courts apply the reworked consent standards. This confusion will likely 
lead to more violations of the Constitution, and “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures”88 will be less secure because of this 
decision.  
                                                                                                                     
New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html (reporting that the 
judge “concluded that the stops, which soared in number over the last decade as crime continued to 
decline, demonstrated a widespread disregard for the Fourth Amendment”). Even if the majority of 
police officers in our country do the best they can to ensure peace while respecting individual rights, 
can society expect officers to know when to draw the line?  
 83. In 2011 and 2012 alone, the Supreme Court decided nine cases dealing with the 
Fourth Amendment. Orin Kerr, Review of the Court’s Fourth Amendment Cases, SCOTUSBLOG 
(July 8, 2011, 1:22 PM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/review-of-the-courts-fourth-
amendment-cases/; Orin Kerr, Reviewing the Fourth Amendment Cases of OT2011, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 10, 2012, 2:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/reviewing-the-
fourth-amendment-cases-of-ot2011/. 
 84. Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1130. 
 85. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). 
 86. Id. at 121. 
 87. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a 
familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, 
because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.”). 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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